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AN APPROACH TO THE REGULATION
OF BANKING INSTITUTIONS
IN A FEDERAL STATE
By JOHN F. CHANT AND JAMES W. DEAN*

I.

INTRODUCTION
The dual system of state and federal regulation in the United States has

been the subject of continuing controversy and conflict, especially in recent
years, as technological developments have reduced the relevance of distinctions arising from the current patterns of regulation. 1 Similarly, in Canada,
the division of responsibility for the regulation of banking institutions between
federal and provincial authorities has been perceived as an obstacle to

legislative reform. 2 Observers have documented the many sources of conflict
arising in a dual banking system. Some have suggested approaches to overcome this conflict through harmonization of policies and changes in the division of authority. However, despite the attention directed to the dual banking
system, we have little understanding of the way in which the pattern', of regulation under a dual system would differ from the pattern that would prevail if a
single authority were responsible for regulation.

The purpose of this paper is to suggest an-approach through which we can
understand the pattern of regulation arising from the interactioi of provincial
and federal authorities in a federal state. Our approach draws on recent
theories developed by Stigler, Posner, Peltzman, and others to understand the
actual behaviour and performance of government agents in regulating
3
industry.

@Copyright, 1982, John F. Chant and James W, Dean
*Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C. The authors
are indebted to the Programs of Distinction, Simon Fraser University; the"Youth
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Economic Research, SimonFraser University; and the Lawtand-Economics Program,
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to Robert Prichard and Michael Trebilcock for their very useful comments.
I Scott, "The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation," in
Edwards, ed., Issues in FinancialRegulation(New York, McGraw Hill, 1979), and The
Patchwork Quilt: State and FederalRoles,in Bank Regulation (1980), 32 Stan. L. Rev.
687. 2
Chant, "Comment on the 1977 Bank Act" (1976), 2 Can. Pub. Pol. 380; and
Economic Council of Canada, Efficiency and Regulation: A Study of Deposit Institutions (Ottawa: Min. of Supply and Services, 1976) at 55-57.
3
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation (1971), 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3;
Posner, Taxation by Regulation (1971), 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 22; and Peltzman,
Capital Investment in Commercial Banking and its Relationship to Portfolio Regulation, [1970] J. Pol. Econ. 1.
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II. A BACKGROUND TO BANKING LEGISLATION IN CANADA
Banking is in many respects an ideal industry for studying differences in
the behaviour of federal and provincial regulators. It is among the most heavily
regulated industries in the Canadian economy; major financial institutions are
subject to exclusive federal, exclusive provincial, and mixed jurisdiction; and
information and analysis with respect "to the regulation and operations of
financial institutions are readily available. This section will acquaint readers
with the main features of Canadian deposit-taking financial institutions and
the structure and rationale of the regulations governing them.
A. Deposit-TakingFinancialInstitutionsin Canada
The group of financial institutions that are the focus of this paper are
often termed "banks and near-banks". (For brevity, we will usually refer to
both simply as "banks".) They can be characterized as "deposit-taking" institutions in that, despite a wide range of differences in their lending and investment powers and practices, they depend on deposits as a major source of
their funds. Thus finance companies, for example, are excluded from our
analysis on the grounds that they cannot raise funds by taking deposits, despite
the fact that their loan markets overlap with those of banks and near-banks.
Also outside our purview are insurance companies and pension funds,
although they are major financial institutions investing in some of the same
kinds of assets as do banking institutions.
The relative sizes of these institutions can be seen from Table I, which
shows the value of deposit liabilities as at December 31, 1981. The chartered
banks, which are federally regulated institutions, are clearly the most important category of deposit-taking institutions by size, accounting for almost two
thirds of total deposits. In 1979, the chartered banks operated almost 7,500
branches across the country. The five largest banks account for roughly ninety
percent of the deposits and branches within this category.
The other two classes of institutions in Table I are both "near-banks".
The trust and mortgage loan companies, many of which operate across the
country, have about 1,100 offices and one third the deposits of the chartered
banks. The deposits of credit unions and caisses populaires, which are permitted to operate only in their province of registration, are one fifth of the total
deposits of the chartered banks. Unlike the banks and trust and loan companies, the credit unions and caisses populaires rarely have branches; in 1979
the 3,680 credit unions in Canada operated only 850 branch offices.
The Structureof Regulation in Canada
Section 91 of the ConstitutionAct, 18674 assigns responsibility for banking and currency matters to the federal government. At the time of Confederation, the chartered banks were the major financial institutions in existence.
Since then, however, the near-banks have become significant financial instituB.

430-31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.), as am. by the Constitution Act, 1982, s. 53, which is
Sched. B of the CanadaAct1982, c. 11 (U.K.).

1982]

Banking InstitutionsIn A FederalState
TABLE I
DEPOSITS AT CANADIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
December 31, 1981
(millions of dollars)
Percent of
deposits

Chartered banks
Canadian dollar deposits

$168,135

67

53,109

21

29,923

12

Trust and mortgage
loan companies
Deposits, guaranteed
investment certificates and
debentures
Credit unions and
caisses populaires
Deposits
Shares

$27,156
2,767

Total deposits at Canadian
financial institutions

$251,167

Source: Bank of Canada, Review, June 1982, S 38, S 99, and S 97.

tions that are in part under provincial control. A banking system with three
types of regulatory jurisdiction has evolved. The chartered banks are under exclusive federal jurisdiction; the credit unions are under exclusive provincial
jurisdiction; and trust and mortgage loan companies are regulated under arrangements that can best be described, following Breton and Scott, 5 as a form
of concurrent regulation. Details are provided in Table II.
Although the meaning of "banking" has never been defined in legislation, 6 for present purposes we will follow the approach of the Bank Act, 7
which states that its provisions apply to institutions (listed in a schedule to the
Act) that have acquired a bank charter under the Act. Federal power over

5 The Economic Constitution of FederalStates (Toronto: U. of T. Press, 1978) at

85.

6Can., Report of the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance(PorterReport)
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964) at 114-15.
7R.S.C. 1970, c. B-1, as am. by S.C. 1980-81-82, c. 40, s. 4.
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TABLE II
Functions and Responsibilities of the Regulators of Deposit Institutions, 1975
Federally incorporated
Trust & mortg..
Chart. banks
loan companies
Federal
Bank of Canada

Lender of last
resort;
regulator of
liquidity

Inspector
General of Banks

Inspector;
admin. of
Bank Act

Canada Deposit
Insurance Corp.
(CDIC)

Insurer of
deposits; lender
of last resort

Superintendent
of Insurance

Min. of
Consumer
& Corp. Affairs

Provincially incorporated
Trust & mortg.
Calsses
loan companies
Credit unions
populaires

Admin. of
Interest Act

Insurer of

Insurer of

deposits; lender
of last resort

deposits
(outside Que.);
lender of last
resort
Admin. of
Small Loans
Act

Inspector;
admin. of
Trust & Loan
Act;
admin. of
Small Loans
Act
Admin. of
Interest Act

Admin. of
Interest Act

Lender of last
resort

Admin. of
Small Loans
Act

Admln. of
Small Loans
Act

Admin. of
Interest Act

Admin. of
Interest Act

Provincial
Quebec Deposit
Insurance Board
(QDIB)

Registrar
of Trust and,
Loan Companies'

Licenser of
business in
provinces

Insurer of
deposits
(in Quebec);
lender of last
resort
Inspector;
admin. of Trust
& Loan Act;
licenser of bus.
in province

Insurer of
deposits; lender
of last resort

Inspector (del.
to centrals);
admin. of
Caisses
Populaires Act

Ministry ofFinancial
Institutions
(Quebec)
Supervisor of
Credit Unions

Credit Union
Reserve Bd.
(some prov.
only)

Inspector;
admin. of
Credit Union
Act
Insurer of
deposits; lender
of last resort

Source: Economic Council of Canada, Efficiency and Regulation: A Study of Deposit Institutions (Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services, 1976), 56,
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chartered banks is exclusive: they are subject to federal labour legislation; their
business powers are defined and limited by the Bank Act; and they do not appear to be subject to provincial laws governing consumer credit. Moreover, in
contrast to the situation in the United States, the possession of a federal
charter enables a Canadian bank to operate throughout the entire country.
At the other extreme are the credit unions, which operate virtually entirely8
under provincial jurisdiction and are confined to the province of registration.
The credit union movement itself is structured, with some variation, in three
tiers. 9 At the lowest level is the credit union local, which can -range:insize from
the numerous locals with assets of less than $100,000 each to a few locals with
assets of $200 million or more. The next tier consists of the provincial central
credit unions which, like the locals, are governed solely by provincial law. At
the top tier is the Canada-wide association of credit unions, the Canadian
Cooperative Credit Society (CCCS), to which the provincial centrals may
adhere. Until recently, the CCCS performed mainly a co-ordinating and
liaison role for the provincial centrals. With the creation of the Canadian
Payments Association for cheque clearing among financial institutions, the
CCCS now may have an expanded role. Nevertheless, the lending and borrowing activities of the locals and the provincial centrals remain a matter of provincial jurisdiction.
The regulation of trust and mortgage loan companies reflects a complex
division of jurisdiction between federal and provincial -authorities.10 These
companies can be incorporated either federally or provincially." Unlike the
banks, trust and mortgage loan companies may not engage in business as
financial institutions in every province merely by virtue of federal or provincial
incorporation. On the other hand, unlike credit unions, they need not be
confined to their province of incorporation. A trust or mortgage loan
company can operate in any province in which it gains a licence from the
appropriate provincial regulator. Thus the trust and mortgage loan companies
can be divided into three groups: (1) federally incorporated companies
8It is interesting to note that Alphonse- Desjardins, the founder of the caisses
populaires movement, sought federal credit unfon legislation in 1907 and for a number

of years thereafter. The initial Bill, though passed in the House of Commons, was

defeated by one vote in the Senate on the basis of an opinion that the legislation was
outside federal jurisdiction. See Neufeld, The FinancialSystem of Canada (Toronto:
Macmillan of Canada, 1972)'at 384-85.
9In Quebec, a tier of regional caisses separates the local caisses from the provincial
centrals.
10 Hereinafter, for convenience, trust companies and mortgageloan companies will
be referred to as trust and mortgage loan companies, and credit unions and caisses
populaires will generally be referred to collectively as credit unions. Trust companies are
frequently owned by mortgage loan companies, and vice versa, -and both carry on
business as financial institutions.
11Provincial authority over trust companies appears to derive from the interpretation that their trustee activities fall under the property jurisdiction of provincial.governments. Their deposit-taking business evolved from trust activities in which guaranteed
funds were viewed as pooled trusts. Even today, the trust company equivalents of bank
deposits are characterized as guaranteed funds (viz., guaranteed investment-certificates).
Nevertheless, they are eligible for protection under the Canada Deposit Insurance
Corporation.
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operating in one or several provinces; (2) provincially incorporated companies operating in several provinces; and (3) provincially incorporated
companies restricted to one province.
Legislation governing trust and mortgage loan companies differs from
one province to another, so incorporation in one jurisdiction does not assure
eligibility to operate in all. The federal and Ontario requirements have
typically been the most stringent. Alberta's appear to have been the most
lenient.12 Strict conformity with a host province's requirements for incorporation is not necessarily required for a trust or mortgage loan company
incorporated federally, or in another province, to do business in the host
province. For example, Royal Trust, when incorporated under a specific Act
of the Quebec legislature, exercised powers beyond those granted to companies
incorporated in Ontario but it nevertheless was permitted to do business in
Ontario.
III. AN APPROACH TO BANKING REGULATION
Traditionally, economists have held that regulation was designed to further the "public interest". More recently, they have turned their attention
from the professed intent of regulation, to explain its "purpose in fact". The
term "purpose in fact" was used by Posner 13 to distinguish sharply between
the reasons ascribed to regulatory laws and decisions by regulators themselves
and the reasons, whether or not avowed, that provide a consistent explanation
of the actual causes and consequences of regulation. Through this change in
emphasis, economists have developed alternatives to the public interest approach that suggest that regulators may be captured by the interests of the
regulated, or that governments may use regulation as a substitute for taxation
as a means of transferring benefits from one group to another. 14 To express
this approach in a generalized formula, the regulators are suppliers of regulation who face a variety of interest groups, whether or not organized as such,
each demanding regulation in its own interests.
Our analysis builds upon these recent theoretical developments in two
respects. First, we accept the premise that the regulator supplies regulation
that balances the demands of competing interest groups so as to maximize the
regulator's self-interest. Where there is direct regulation by government, the
regulator may be motivated by the government's need for re-election. Where
regulatory authority has been delegated to a government bureau or commission, the regulator's self-interest leads to an agent-principal relationship in
which the actions of the regulator, while constrained, may not correspond exactly to the interests of the government. The relevant point for analysis,
however, is that the regulator as a supplier of regulation responds to the
demands of different interest groups at least in some degree in proportion to
their ability to contribute to maintenance of the existing political authority.
12See Part V, Section A, infra, for an episode illustrating differences that existed
between federal and Ontario regulations and those in Alberta.
13Posner, supra note 3.

14 Indeed, economists have described this type of regulation as "implicit taxation"
in contrast to "explicit" taxation through fiscal devices.
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The second element of our approach draws from recent developments in
the theory that suggest that regulation has a distribution of costs and benefits
over different groups in the economy and that the net benefit of regulation
overall can be either negative or positive. As a basis for classifying the impacts
of different regulatory measures, we have developed a simply expository
device. Consider an industry with two groups of consumers a and b; two
groups of producers, c and d; and a government g. The gains from any policy
to any one of these groups can be represented as x (x Z 0) and the aggregate
gain can be represented by X (X Z 0). The effects of any policy can be
represented by the expression

{X Ixa, xb; x c, Xd; xg}.
The use of this device suggests immediately a twofold classification of
regulation according to the value of X. The first alternative, X > 0, corresponds to what can be characterized as public interest regulation. In financial markets, for example, such an outcome would result from regulations
that, by classifying institutions by their investment powers, reduce the amount
of expense incurred by customers in gathering information. This regulation
could also be in the interests of producers of financial services by increasing
the demand for their services. Such a policy would be represented as

{X>OIxa, xb, xC, xd _:0}.
Measures that have an aggregate positive effect need not benefit all parties. A regulation that set minimum capital/asset ratios for financial institutions could benefit only some customers and financial institutions. Customers
and financial institutions that were unwilling to give up returns in order to
reduce risk might be harmed by such a regulation. In this case the policy would
be expressed as
{X>OIxa<O, Xb>O; Xc>O, Xd<O},
where customers in xb are more risk averse than those in xa.
The second alternative, X<O, corresponds more closely to recently
developed approaches that view regulation as a device distributing benefits to
some groups in the economy at the expense of others. While, traditionally,
redistribution was often deemed compatible with X=0, economists now
recognize that the process of redistribution generates costs through (1) administration of the process, (2) efforts of individuals to qualify for the
benefits, and (3) parallel efforts of individuals to avoid the costs of the
redistribution. The set of possibilities with X < 0 includes several cases:
1. {X<Oxa>0, Xb<0; xe>0, xd<0}. This case corresponds to Posner's
analysis of taxation by regulation. 15 Group b consumers are required as a consequence of the regulation to pay more for the output whereas group a is subsidized by lower prices. Similarly group c producers may find that their costs
I5 Posner, supranote 3.
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are lowered at the expense of higher costs for group d. An example of such
regulation would be a ceiling on the proportion of bank assets that could be
held in any particular investment such as mortgages. Such a regulation works
to the detriment of home owners and to the benefit of other borrowers from
banks. It also reduces the profits of banks while reducing competition for
near-banks in mortgage markets.
2. {X<Oxa, xb_<0; XC xd>0}. This case corresponds to Stigler's "capture by industry." 1 6 As in the previous case, overall losses arise from
redistribution but the costs are imposed on either or both groups of consumers
and the benefits accrue to the producers. In other words, this case corresponds
to regulation in the producers' interest. Minimum capital requirements and
similar measures that restrict entry by new financial institutions are an example of this type of regulation because they permit higher profits for established
institutions at the expense of higher prices for users of financial services.
3. {X<Olx a, xb; Xe,Xd--0; X_>0}. Finally, there is the possibility that
regulation may reduce the general revenue needs of the government. Case 3
can be distinguished from case 1 because while someone may benefit from the
reduced revenue needs of the government, that beneficiary may be neither a
customer of financial institutions nor a producer of financial services. The
clearest example of case 3 in the regulation of financial institutions is the
minimum primary reserve requirements, which force financial institutions to
hold more cash than they would have otherwise, thereby providing the government with a conscripted market for interest-free debt.
IV. REGULATION IN A FEDERAL STATE
Our purpose in this section is to develop a theoretical framework to help
us understand the defacto division of responsibilty for the regulation of financial institutions between two levels of government: a federal level covering an
entire country and a provincial level covering only part of the country. Our
purpose is quite limited. We do not attempt to explain any original division of
powers such as the assignment of banking and currency matters to the federal
government under the British North America (now Constitution) Act. Our
starting point resembles the situation at Confederation when the federal
government was assigned responsibility for regulating a small group of
chartered banks that were collectively the dominant financial institutions in
the country at that time. Our approach proceeds by exploring the types of
regulation that a federal regulator would attempt to apply in such a situation,
paying heed to the demands of the various groups having an interest in the
content and effects of such regulation. For the financial sector these groups
consist of the general public as users of financial services, the financial institutions themselves as the producersof financial services, and the government as
a party with an interest in taxing, either explicitly or implicitly, the activity in
financial markets.
In this section we first describe the type of regulatory structure that might
be reached -bysuch a solitary regulator. We then examine the incentives that
16 Stigler, supranote 3.
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this system of federal regulation creates for provincial regulators to encourage
the development of alternative financial institutions under their jurisdiction.
Before assessing these incentives we note one of the most important constraints for the regulators of financial institutions: the so-called fungible
nature of capital. Perhaps the foremost characteristic of capital markets in
comparison with other markets such as the labour market, the market for
finished goods, or the market for natural resources, is the ability of the owners
of capital to avoid taxation or government regulation by changing the form,
location, or ostensible ownership of capital.1 7 This characteristic of the stock
in trade of financial markets serves as a substantial constraint on attempts by
provincial governments to create an alternative framework of regulation to exploit federal regulations for provincial benefit.
We recognize that our approach to the division of responsibility for
regulation of financial institutions is to a considerable degree artificial,
postulating as it does the prior existence of a federal regulator and the subsequent reaction of a provincial regulator to existing federal regulation. An
alternative, though one that lacks historical basis, could start from the prior
existence of provincial authorities, examine the types of regulations they
would develop, and predict the subsequent response of a federal regulator to
the system of provincial regulation. Given its lack of historical veracity, we expect that this approach would be less satisfactory than the present one.
Ultimately, the analysis should be conducted in a framework similar to the
economists' general equilibrium approach, which recognizes a complex interdependent interaction among market participants. In the case of the interaction of regulators, however, the sequence of action and reaction of the participants may be more likely to shape the final outcome than it does in market
processes.
A.

The Regulator'sIncentives in a UnitaryState
The starting point for our analysis is an examination of incentives facing
the regulator of financial institutions in a unitary state. Our approach
describes the forces operating on this regulator in terms of the demand for and
supply of regulation. Under demand for regulation we consider the lenders
and borrowers who, in effect, are users of the services of financial institutions:
the financial institutions themselves, which supply financial services; and the
government, which views financial activity as a source of command over
resources through taxation, whether explicit or implicit. Under supply of
regulation we consider the regulator's response to the competing demands,
taking into account the constraints imposed by the nature of financial markets
and the regulator's own incentives as determined by its role in the government.
This framework is very broad, but, as can be readily recognized, it leads to a
synthesis of the existing theories of regulation that emphasizes public interest,
capture of regulators, and taxation through regulation.
17 Recent Canadian experience affords many examples: the de facto development
of a market in depreciation allowances through the growth of leasing; the use of swapped
foreign currency deposits to avoid the Winnipeg agreement limiting the rates paid by the
chartered banks; and the use of other imaginative financing arrangements to minimize

taxes. In a broader context, the recent changes in American banking and the growth of
the Eurodollar market provide further evidence.
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1.

Demands of Users
Users of financial markets desire an "efficient" market in which lenders
can be assured that their funds are allocated to their most productive uses and
borrowers can be assured that they obtain their funds from the cheapest
source. When this "allocative efficiency" is achieved, the financial markets
are operating in a way consistent with maximizing the output of the economy
as a whole. Traditionally, economists have judged "efficiency" according to
the degree to which resources are free to move among competing uses. Government intervention has been justified by the existence of such sources of socalled market failure as monopoly and externalities. Recently, however,
economists have come to recognize that interventionist practices must be
evaluated in the light of criteria of actual performance.
The workings of the capital markets create an unusual set of problems for
market participants because the transactions involve the separation of exchange over time. In a trivial sense, a financial transaction can be considered
as a transfer of value at a point in time: the customer exchanges current value
with a financial institution for a promise to pay in the future. In a primitive
financial system, the onus is on customers of financial institutions to determine whether the other side of the exchange will be honoured. Potential
lenders may refrain from participating in financial markets when the expected
costs of obtaining information offset any gain to be expected from lending. Individual costs of obtaining information can be reduced in several ways: centralized information collection and interpretation, contracts between financial
institutions and their customers governing the risks to which the investors'
funds are subject, and various forms of guarantees and insurance.
Risks in financial markets are not limited to the relationship between a
financial institution and its own customers. Failure of one financial institution
to meet its obligations to its customers will impose costs on all such institutions
by decreasing the confidence of their customers;' 8 a resulting outflow of funds
may jeopardize the solvency of institutions that did not undertake the same
risks as the defaulting institution. Other costs may be incurred because some
institutions, to protect themselves against default-prone competitors, may be
forced to hold more liquid portfolios than they would otherwise.
The role of financial institutions in providing the money supply leads to a
second form of "externality", this time among customers. The usefulness of a
medium of exchange derives from its general acceptability. Individuals hold
money in the expectation that people with whom they trade also use money.
When the supply of money is offered by a variety of different suppliers, the
risk exists that the form of the money will not be acceptable because one or
more of the suppliers may be unable to convert its money at its established
value relative to the money issued by other suppliers.
18This problem is hardly unique to financial markets. People clearly have definite
images of used car dealers that may be difficult for an individual dealer to overcome.
Still, both sides of a used car transaction, payment and receipt of title, occur
simultaneously. While the future performance of the car may be open to doubt, the
buyer can perform a mechanical inspection. The parallel to the problems in financial
markets would be captured in the performance of car dealers with respect to guarantees.
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These arguments suggest a role for three forms of collective action: (1) information collection and interpretation; (2) contracts with financial institutions governing the risks to which the investors' funds may be subject; and
(3) insurance against the risks from participating in financial markets. These
arguments do not necessarily lead to a case for government intervention.
Research now being carried out on the workings of financial systems that have
evolved without government intervention indicates that in some cases private
parties do carry out centralized information gathering. The point should not
be overstated; it illustrates only that it is possible for private arrangements to
enforce sound practices on private financial institutions. Whether these private
arrangements have served as an adequate substitute for government intervention requires further study.
Although the risks of financial transactions may be minimized effectively
through private arrangements, economists have generally held that the soundness of the financial system is best ensured by government intervention. It is
argued that any attempt by private arrangements to protect individuals from
the risks of financial transactions inevitably shifts these risks just one stage
further to the private guarantor. Any guarantor must have the ability to meet
his claims by offering a claim that is generally acceptable. Credibility is
enhanced when the claim is upheld by government.
Government intervention can and has taken a wide variety of forms. The
government can enable users of financial institutions to economize on information costs by establishing standard categories of financial institutions, each
with a set of defined powers limiting certain risks facing its customers. In effect, the customer need not negotiate individually, or determine the nature of
the contract with each institution. Instead, he chooses the institution with the
powers closest to his preferences. In addition, contracts of this nature are enforced largely through bank inspection and the imposition of penalities for
violation. Finally, governments have taken on the role of guarantor of certain
classes of financial transactions, though sometimes only implicitly. 19
2.

Demands of Producers
The second group demanding regulation is the financial institutions
themselves. In many instances, their interests correspond with those of the
users and no conflict faces the regulator. It can gain the support of both
groups by the same actions. 20 On the other hand, the interests of the producers
of financial services may be directly opposed to those of their customers and
the regulator is forced to make a choice. Let us consider these possibilities in
that order.
Measures to reduce customers' information costs and risks are likely to
benefit the financial institutions as well. Transaction costs in any market can
19 The Federal Government in Canada provided compensation for up to thirty-five
percent of the deposit balances held by individuals with the Home Bank when it failed in
1923.20Deposit insurance was not established until 1967.
In terms of our earlier taxonomy, this circumstance would correspond to
{X>01Xa, Xb

0, xc, Xd>0}.
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be viewed as affecting the demand facing sellers because these costs become
part of the price that buyers must pay. Hence, measures that reduce such costs
and risks may be welcomed by financial institutions.
For reasons of self-interest, as Stigler', and others have pointed out,
regulated firms may advocate measures that benefit them at the expense of
their customers. Regulations in the interests of the regulated include restrictions on entry and agreements to limit any form of competition that has the
potential to dissipate producer profits. In banking, regulations that benefit the
producers' interests include high initial capital requirements in order to
become incorporated, and ceilings on interest rates paid to depositors.
Some ambiguity exists, however, with respect to the interpretation of
capital requirements, because a high invested equity from bank owners may
serve to insulate bank depositors from risk. To some extent, the "purpose in
fact" of capital requirements can be inferred from their particular form.
Capital requirements that establish a minimum ratio of capital to liabilities
could be justified on grounds of depositor protection; moreover, they constrain the behaviour of large and small banks alike. In contrast, absolute
capital requirements that must be met by a new entrant, as in Canada, are
more difficult to justify on grounds of depositor protection; such requirements
do not affect large banks and are unrelated to the size of outstanding
liabilities.
The theory of regulation in the interests of producers suggests that the
strength of producers' pressures for regulation varies from industry to industry according to particular circumstances. Producers' interests are more
likely to be reflected where the costs of organization are small and where the
benefits of regulation can be readily confined to particular groups. The cost
conditions are most likely to be satisfied in an industry with a small number of
producers, whereas dissipation of the benefits can be avoided most easily
where formal entry into the industry can be limited and where the product in
question has few close substitutes.
Demand from Government
The final party with an interest in the regulation of financial institutions is
the government itself. For the purpose of our analysis, the interests of government in its role as regulator of financial markets can be distinguished from its
3.

interests in other capacities. Only the latter aspects are relevant for our discus-

sion of government as a demander of regulation.
The government demands regulation independently of the users and producers in any industry to the extent that it can achieve some goal more cheaply
or easily through this means than through others at its disposal. Regulation on
behalf of the government can be viewed as a form of taxation, in that
resources are transferred from some participants in the regulated industry to
the government itself, or to other participants in the regulated industry, or
even to parties outside the regulated industry. Government demand for regulation of any industry can be expected to vary with the perceived costs of achieving the desired transfer by other means, such as the use of explicit taxation.
The government's demand for regulation of financial markets can be met
in a number of different ways. Regulations that require financial institutions
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to hold government debt on favourable terms transfer resources from users of
financial markets and suppliers of financial services to the government itself.
The minimum cash reserve ratio is the most familiar and undoubtedly the most
ubiquitous example of this type of regulation. Compulsory holdings of other
types of securities such as home mortgages or loans to small businesses provide
a means by which government can tax some users of financial markets to the
benefit of others.
The Supply of Regulation
In our framework, the regulator supplies regulation in response to the
competing demands of users, suppliers, and government itself. A complete
theory of regulation requires prior explanation of the objectives of the
regulator and the constraints it faces. If we identify the regulator with the
political authority, we need some model of political decision-making such as
the vote-maximizing model or the median-voter model. If, on the other hand,
we view the regulator as a government department or bureau, we need also to
adopt a theory that explains the relationship between the political authority
and its agents. However, we would be taken well beyond our purpose if we
developed these models fully. Instead, we proceed from the assumption that
any regulator of financial institutions will formulate a system of regulation
that balances the interests of the various demanders of regulation in terms of
their contribution to its own goals as a regulator.
4.

The Regulator'sIncentives in a FederalState
Our analysis to this point describes the incentives facing a regulator of
financial institutions in a unitary state. As discussed earlier, our model of
regulation in a federal state starts from the assumption of a set of regulations
established by an existing federal regulator and considers the incentives created
by this system of regulation for the provincial authority in designing its regulation. We proceed from our initial model of the regulatory agency in a unitary
state to examine the competing demands for regulation at the provincial level.
The incentives facing the provincial regulator of financial institutions are
distinctly different from those facing the federal regulator. Not only does the
provincial regulator have the opportunity to react to federal regulation, he also
faces a more limited constituency. Like the federal regulator, he balances the
demands of users, producers, and government, but his interest is in regulating
in favour of the needs of users, producers, and governments in his jurisdiction
relative to those outside. We identify three different sources of differences in
incentives for provincial and federal regulators: (1) spill-over of benefits;
(2) avoidance of costs; and (3) differential composition of constituency.
In order to analyze the cases where federal and provincial incentives
diverge, we can extend our analytical framework by designating users, suppliers, and governments within a province by ap subscript and those within the
entire country by an f subscript. Inasmuch as provincial constituents are a
subgroup of federal constituents, we also use the subscript n to refer to federal
constituents who are not constituents in the province under consideration.
B.

1.

Spillover of Benefits
Different incentives exist for federal and provincial regulators when some
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of the benefits from any regulation spill over beyond the domain of the provincial regulator. Consider, for example, a regulation directed toward depositor
safety that imposes costs on a group of financial institutions. As we have
already seen, this regulation has both direct benefits to the customers of that
group and indirect benefits to other financial institutions and their customers
resulting from the constribution of these safety regulations to the overall
stability of the financial system. When considered from the perspective of a
federal regulator, such safety regulations could have net benefits represented
as
{Xf = X

n

+ Xp >Olxan + Xap> -Xsp}

whereas from a provincial standpoint such regulations need not give positive
benefits. For example, the same policy when viewed at the provincial level
might be represented as
{Xp <0xap< -Xsp}.

Thus the provincial regulator will be less likely than a federal regulator to
implement policies that impose costs on financial institutions under its
jurisdiction because more of the benefits will "spill-over" to institutions and
individuals outside its jurisdiction.
2.

Avoidance of Costs
The second case in which incentives differ among regulators at different
levels of government can be viewed as almost the inverse of the first. In this
case, the federal regulator cannot exclude provincial constituents from the
benefits of federal policy. The provincial government then has an incentive to
shield its constituents from sharing in the costs of federal regulations while
continuing to share in the benefits. Nevertheless, the net benefits as perceived
by the federal regulator remain positive.
Such a policy could be presented as
{Xf>Olxap = Xan + Xap >0, Xsf <0}.

Moreover, the requirement that provincial users of federally regulated financial institutions cannot be excluded from the benefits of federal policies as the
provincial regulator reacts to federal legislation can be represented by
AXa >- whereA's represent changes. In other words, the decrease in benefits
arising from the provincial government's supply response must be smaller than
the decrease in costs to provincial institutions, so that there is a net benefit for
provincial constituents from the actions of its regulators.
This "avoidance of costs" must be distinguished from the preceding
"spill-over of benefits". The main difference between the two cases arises
from the contexts in which they apply. In the "spill-over of benefits" situation
we compare the incentives of provincial and federal regulators, each acting in
isolation. The incentives for a provincial regulator differ from those of a
federal regulator because from its standpoint some of the benefits of its regula-
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tion are dissipated beyond its constituency, whereas for the federal regulator
they are not. In the case of "avoidance of costs" the provincial regulator
reacts to existing federal regulation in ways that maintain the benefits for its
constituents while allowing them to avoid the costs. 2 1 Obviously the ability to
react in this way is partly determined by policies chosen by the federal
regulator.
Composition of Constituencies
The final source of variance between provincial and federal regulations
derives from differences in the composition of their constitlencies across users
and producers and across different groups of users. The provincial regulator,
even if it were the only regulator, might choose an entirely different pattern of
regulation, subject of course to the constraints imposed by the operation of
capital markets. Variations in regulation arising in this way are difficult to
predict without knowing in advance the differences between the relevant constituencies. Among the more easily observed factors that would influence the
composition of the constituency are whether industry (as a large demander of
funds) or financial institutions (as suppliers of financial services) are
domestically owned. We expect regulators to be more likely to use regulation
to tax groups that are not domestically owned (and hence have a more limited
voice) for the benefit of other groups that are more obviously constituents.
3.

EVIDENCE FROM THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE
Up to this point we have described the forces that we expect would influence the nature of the regulations applied to financial institutions by federal
and provincial regulators in a federal state. Now we can turn to assessing the
degree to which this approach helps in interpreting the actual pattern of
regulations governing financial institutions in Canada. We discuss in turn the
evidence relating to our hypotheses that (1) provincial regulators are influenced
by the spill-over of benefits from their regulation, (2) provincial regulators act
to permit their constituents to avoid the costs of federal regulations, and
(3) provincial regulations reflect differences between the provincial constituency and the federal constituency.
V.

A. Spillover of Benefits
We have argued that provincial regulators may be less willing than their
federal counterparts to institute regulations of a particular type because they
know that part of the benefit of their regulation will spill over beyond the
limits of their constituency. An example is depositor safety regulation. The
greater safety of institutions under the provincial regulator's jurisdiction can
protect institutions in other jurisdictions from potential "deposit run-offs".
Yet a provincial regulator might be less appreciative than a federal regulator of
21 It is interesting to consider whether a federal regulator has a corresponding incentive to react in response to existing provincial regulation. The analysis will clearly not
be symmetrical. Note that xP is part of xf so that the federal regulator needs to be con-

cerned about the constituents of the province. In contrast, xn is not part of x so the

provincial regulator is unconcerned with federal constituents who live oufside its

jurisdiction.
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the effects of depositor safety regulation in improving the environment for
these other financial institutions, and as a result be less likely to impose costs
on financial institutions under its jurisdiction. This proposition is supported
by: (1) legislative provisions in various jurisdictions that are directed to safety;
and (2) the ability of different institutions to qualify for coverage under
deposit insurance.
Consider the initial capital requirements imposed on new financial institutions. In 1969, according to information compiled by Quebec's Study Committee on Financial Institutions, 22chartered banks were required to have initial
capital of at least $1,000,000. In contrast, trust companies incorporated in Ontario were required to have $500,000
capital and those incorporated in Quebec
23
needed only $250,000 capital.
Secondly, consider the borrowing powers granted to trust and mortgage
loan companies. Federal and Ontario authorities limit the ratio of trust and
mortgage loan company borrowings to their capital and reserves. The control
is two-fold: (1) ceilings specified in legislation; and (2) discretion granted to
authorities to set the ratios for individual firms within these limits. The comparison is complicated because the federal and Ontario statutes have been
revised at different times so that the ceilings applied to the companies have
varied depending on the date of observation. Recently, however, the federal
and provincial statutes have been substantially the same with respect to borrowing powers. More relevant in practice, then, are the authorities' decisions
with respect to individual firms. Table III shows the minimum borrowing
ratios for 1971 that were available for federally and provincially incorporated
trust and mortgage loan companies operating in Ontario.2 4 While the sample is
small, it reveals that the provincially incorporated companies generally were
permitted to have higher borrowing ratios than federal companies. Moreover,
it would appear that larger companies are permitted higher borrowing ratios;
since federal companies were on average substantially larger, the difference in
discretionary policy is apparently even greater. Finally, the fact that the
authorities in Quebec do not impose any borrowing limits on trust and mortgage loan companies incorporated in that province lends further support to
our proposition. 25

2 Que., Report of the Study Committee on FinancialInstitutions (Quebec: Province of Quebec, 1969) at 62.
2 It should be noted that in the United States federally-incorporated banks have

historically been subject to higher capital requirements than have other banks. A further test of our hypothesis could be made by examining capital requirements on a stateby-state basis. We would predict that regulators in larger states would be conscious of

their ability to capture more of the external effects within their own state and as a result
be more willing to impose stringent requirements.

2 This was the final year in which the authorities published the appropriate data
for making the comparison.
2 Chartered banks are not subject to any explicit minimum capital to asset ratios.
Rather, section 175 (1)of the Bank Act, supranote 7, states that "a bank shall, in relation to its operations, maintain adequate capital ..... The absence of any explicit limit
does not support our explanation. On the other hand, a set of provincially regulated institutions, credit unions, traditionally have also not been subject to borrowing limits.
Recently some provinces have taken steps to introduce such limits.
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For further evidence, we may examine the ability of financial institutions
to qualify for deposit insurance when the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC) was established in 1967. Membership in the CDIC was made compulsory for all federally incorporated financial institutions. At the same time,
a number of provinces enacted parallel legislation requiring all financial institutions under their jurisdiction to become members of the CDIC. The
Canada Deposit Insurance CorporationAct 26 stipulated that a provincial institution is eligible for insurance if it agrees, in carrying on its business,
not to exercise powers substantially different from the powers exercisable by a
trust company under the
27 Trust CompaniesAct and a loan companies under the
Loan CompaniesAct.
Thus the CDIC was required to review the business of provincial companies in
order to determine whether they qualified. As it turned out, the government of
Alberta in 1967 accepted an Indemnity Agreement with the CDIC on behalf of
a nufitber of trust companies incorporated in that province. 28 The point to note
is that at least one province was permitting financial institutions to operate
under terms different from, and apparently less stringent than, the federal
legislation for comparable institutions.
B.

Avoidance of Costs
Our second argument suggested that provincial regulators would act so as
to permit demanders and suppliers of financial services under their jurisdiction
to avoid the costs of federal regulation. We illustrate this argument by
reference to two federal measures that can be interpreted as devices to tax by
means of regulation. The first such measure, the minimum cash and secondary
reserve requirements imposed on the chartered banks, can be viewed as an implicit tax on the banks, requiring them to hold federal government debt on
favourable terms. The second measure sought to protect Canadian ownership
of banking by limiting the degree of foreign ownership in any chartered bank
to less than twenty-five percent of the outstanding stock. 29 These measures,
and the provincial reactions to them, are considered below.

26 CanadaDeposit InsuranceCorporationAct, R.S.C. 1970, c. c-3, s. 16 (b).
27 In both cases, the reference is to the relevant federal statute.
28 See various issues of Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation, Annual Report.
The indemnity agreement was still in effect at the date of the 1979 Annual Report. A
similar agreement was reached with Ontario to accept institutions under its jurisdiction
without prior examination. This indemnity was removed within a year after the companies were examined. See Annual Reports for 1967 and 1968.
29 When this regulation was initially applied in 1968, the one bank that failed to
conform was subject to limitations on its business until it came into conformity. After
1980, foreign owned banks were permitted to operate in Canada, subject, however, to
more c6nstraints than domestically owned banks.
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TABLE III
Maximum Borrowing Powers:
Trust and Mortgage Loan Companies, 1971
Assets
Incorporation (millions of C$)
1. Twenty times unimpaired capital and
reserves
National Trust
Victoria and Gray Trust
Montreal Trust
Metropolitan Trust
Crown Trust
Royal Trust Mortgage
Raymor Mortgage
Jordan Mortgage
Hamilton Trust

F
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P

645
541
526
137
129
110
102
74
20

2. Eighteen times unimpaired capital and
reserves
Ontario Trust
Federal Mortgage
Country Mortgage

P
P
P

104
18
11

3. Fifteen times unimpaired capital and
reserves
Huron and Erie Mortgage
Kinross Mortgage
Canborough Mortgage
United Trust

F
F
P
P

770
310
44
34

4. Twelve and one half times unimpaired
capital and reserves
Canada Permanent Mortgage
District Trust
Dominion Trust
Canada First Mortgage

F
P
P
P

853
23
6
4

5. Ten times unimpaired capital and
reserves
Eastern Canada Mortgage

F

207

6. Eight times unimpaired capital and
reserves
Credit Foncier Mortgage
Landmark Mortgage

P
P

315
8

F - Federal Incorporation

P-

Provincial Incorporation

Source: Ontario, Report of the Registrar of Loan and Trust Corporations,
Business of 1971, passim.
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The minimum cash and secondary reserve requirements in federal banking legislation can reasonably be interpreted as attempts to tax the chartered
banks and their customers. In fact, the measures are comparable to an explicit
tax measure in that the government has less need for revenue from other
sources because chartered banks are required to hold federal government
securities on favourable terms. As noted earlier, any measures of this sort tax
users and producers of bank services to the benefit of taxpayers at large. 30 A
provincial authority can permit its constituents to avoid the costs of such a tax
and still share in the general benefits of the revenues by sheltering the financial
institutions under its jurisdiction from the reserve requirements. The effectiveness of such action depends on the degree to which provincial institutions
can provide financial services that are close substitutes to those offered by
banks. The federal authorities are subject to pressures from producers of
financial services to reduce the tax through reserve requirements, but are less
likely to remove these requirements because they, unlike provincial
authorities, stand to lose revenues from such a step. It can be predicted that
provincial authorities will oppose the imposition of reserve requirements on
provincial institutions that benefit the federal government. The provincial
regulator then has a number of options: it can substitute another form of
reserve requirement that shelters securities of the province; it can take
measures that substitute alternative forms of taxation through regulation; or it
can set lower costs of regulation for its users and producers of financial services.
The application of cash and secondary reserve requirements to financial
institutions has been a major area of dispute between federal and provincial
authorities in recent years. In 1964, the federal Royal Commission on Banking
and Finance (the Porter Commission) 31 recommended that all deposit-taking
institutions be subject to the same set of regulations, including reserve requirements, for reasons of administrative efficiency, equity, and competition.
Implementation of these proposals would have required sweeping changes in
federal legislation. However, the Bank Act revisions of 1967 were confined to
narrow issues related to the chartered banks. The federal initiative to apply
reserve requirements to provincially-regulated financial institutions was
renewed with the proposals of August 1976, which made the acceptance of
reserve requirements the quid pro quo for membership of near-banks in the
Canadian Payments Association. 32 While producer interests have protested
strongly, provincial opposition to the extension of reserve requirements has
also been persistent and unequivocal. In 1969 the Study Committee on Finan-30 Calculations by the Economic Council of Canada, in Efficiency andRegulation,

supra note 2, based on the assumption that the banks would voluntarily have held an
amount equal to one-half the existing reserves, suggest that the reserve requirements
made bank profits 4.3 percentage points per year lower than they would otherwise have

been. These calculations were based on the assumption that capital in banking is im-

mobile. If, instead, capital were assumed to be perfectly mobile, the reserve requirements would raise the costs of banking services by the amount by which the Council calculates that profits were reduced.
31 Supranote 6.
32
Can., White Paperon the Revision of CanadianBanking Legislation (Ottawa:
Min. of Supply and Services, 1976).
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cial Institutions of the Province of Quebec recommended that near-banks33
should not be required to maintain cash reserves with the Bank of Canada.
Likewise, the federal White Paperof 1976 was met by vigorous protest from
the Quebec and other provincial governments, with much of the protest
directed to the proposals regarding reserve requirements. While, as might be
expected, the controversy has not settled on the merits of an implicit tax levied
by the federal government, it is interesting to note that arguments relating to
the necessity of reserve requirements for monetary control and assurance of
depositor liquidity have been readily accepted by federal authorities and invariably rejected by their provincial counterparts.
The attitudes of various authorities to the ownership of financial institutions provide a further example of attempts by provincial authorities to relieve
their constituents of the costs of federal measures that "tax" through regulation. In 1967, in response to the move by First National City Bank to take over
a small, specialized chartered bank, 34 the Canadian government introduced
measures that effectively limited the degree of foreign ownership of chartered
banks to less than twenty-five percent of outstanding capital. Following the
economic analysis of nationalism developed by Breton, 35 this move may be
viewed as a measure to protect the interests of Canadian owners at the expense
of bank users. In effect, users were denied the benefits of competition between
Canadian and foreign-owned banks, while at the same time owners of capital
employed in banking were sheltered from competitive pressures arising from
the presence of foreign-owned banks. Our analysis suggests that provincial
authorities would be less eager to adopt these measures, because identical
legislation at the provincial level would protect all Canadain owners of financial institutions regardless of their province of residence. By avoiding parallel
measures directed to protect Canadian ownership, provincial authorities can
provide an outlet by which users of financial institutions under their jurisdiction can avoid the costs of ownership restrictions while their resident bank
owners continue to benefit from the federal measures as do residents of other
provinces. Provincial authorities concerned with protecting constituents who
own financial institutions would be expected to find measures for protecting
only their constituents. The Quebec Study Committee on Financial Institutions recognized this point explicitly, stating:
we cannot see why Quebec should block a foreign group- American,
say - from taking control of an institution chartered in Quebec, when an Ontario
or Western Canadian group could have access to it. If our aim is to maintain control of financial institutions in Quebec hands, we do not see why a New York
group should be treated differently from Toronto or Winnipeg groups. This could
be answered by saying that Quebec legislation should be adapted in such a way as
to prevent groups outside Quebec -36 rather than foreign groups - from gaining
control of our financial institutions.

33

Supra note 22, at 183.

34We should note that the intended purchase by Citibank was not precedentsetting. The Mercantile Bank, the target, was already foreign-owned. In addition,

several foreign banks had operated in earlier times. The last, Barclays, was taken over
by the Imperial Bank in 1956. Mercantile, however, would have been the first chartered

bank to be owned by Americans.

35 The Economicsof Nationalism (1964), 72 J. Pol. Econ. 376.
36
Supra note 22, at 203-204.
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The Committee saw difficulties both in practice and in principle in invoking
such measures and chose not to limit ownership from outside Quebec. Nevertheless, the Committee seemed well aware that these measures were in the interest of the owners of financial institutions and saw no reason for the Quebec
government to act to benefit Canadian owners of financial institutions
regardless of their residence. Subsequent governments in Quebec have been attracted to the principle of encouraging Quebec ownership of financial institutions and have taken active (and successful) steps to discourage take-over at37
tempts of Quebec-based institutions by extra-provincial interests. If, as
Breton's theory of nationalism posits, such ownership clauses are intended to
protect the interests of Canadian owners at the expense of bank users, then
these actions are consistent with our theory.
C. DifferentialConstituency Effects
Our final proposition suggested that provincial and federal patterns of
regulation for financial institutions would differ as a function of the different
constituencies. We would not expect the same balancing of user, producer,
and government interests to occur at the provincial as at the federal level.
Moreover, provinces differ with respect to the relative political strength of
borrowers' and lenders' interests, the nature of borrowers' interests, the importance of producers' interests, and the appeal of regulation as a form of taxation. We could predict differences in the approach taken toward regulation of
financial institutions if we had sufficient information about the respective differences in constituency.
The development of the credit union movement provides some limited
support for this view. Credit unions (or caisses populaires) operate in every
province. The various measures of credit union activity shown in Table IV indicate that the size of the credit union movement varies substantially among
the provinces. This can be attributed in part, at least, to differences in the approach taken by the provincial regulators. For example, Ontario continued to
require "bonds of association" through common place of employment,
religion, or occupation long after such principles were effectively abandoned
by authorities in other provinces. The caisse populaire movement in Quebec
was always based on the much less restrictive principle of residence within a
parish, and even this requirement was loosely enforced.
Several aspects of the regulation of the credit union movement should be
noted for present purposes. Provincial regulators, in general, permit credit
unions and their customers to escape the costly elements of regulation, such as
the primary and secondary reserve requirements borne by the banks. This
aspect by itself is consistent with efforts by provincial authorities to allow their
constituents to avoid the implicit taxation of the federal government. These

37 The Globe andMail (Toronto), Dec. 7, 1978, at B6: "Quebec will take action to
block sale of Credit Foncier". The FinancialPost, Dec. 16, 1978, stated: "Some financial executives think this takeover is a situation that the Quebec government has been
seeking. It would give the government an opportunity to put legislation in place without
taking on one of the giants, such as Royal Trust. Once legislation is in place giving the
government the authority to approve takeovers.., the legislation would be there for
future use."
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costs could be avoided through fostering credit institutions with broader investment powers than those possessed by the credit unions. Such an approach
has been rejected, however. Credit unions are restricted generally to consumer
loans and residential mortgages on the asset side of their portfolio. This
restriction is consistent with actions by provincial authorities to establish conditions favouring several groups - household savers and borrowers - by
permitting them to avoid the taxation implicit in federal regulation. We would
expect authorities to give the credit union movement the greatest encouragement in provinces where the interest of consumers are strongest relative to
other users and traditional producers of financial services.
TABLE IV
Measures of Credit Unions and Banks by Province, 1979
(millions of dollars)
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
Personal
Credit
Bank
Savings
Union
Bank
Accounts Business
Bank
Assets
Assets
Liabilities at Banks
Loans
Newfoundland
Prince Edward Island
Nova Scotia
New Brunswick
Quebec
Ontario
Manitoba
Saskatchewan
Alberta
British Columbia

11,780
4,711
1,265
2,381
1,750
4,196

1,434
385
3,283
2,124
27,119
65,780
5,766
4,638
15,817
18,279

852
241
1,662
1,202
10,570
27,624
3,118
2,935
6,440
9,429

515
131
893
756
8,498
17,408
1,466
763
7,840
5,980

2,095
453
3,792
2,600
29,523
61,020
6,390
5,063
20,670
20,143

Source: Statistics Canada, 61-209, Credit Unions 1979, at 28-29; Bank of
Canada, Review, February 1981, at S46-S49.

Evidence of the relative development of credit unions can be used to test
our hypothesis. As a first step, we must determine the relative strengths of different interest groups in the various provinces. To approximate the pressures
of business interests, we use a variety of measures of the importance of
business loans granted by chartered banks. On the basis of the data according
to province, negative and significant relationships were found between
measures of the strength of the credit union and these measures of the
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pressures of business interests for equations omitting the Atlantic provinces
(Table V). 38 While far from definitive, this evidence from the relative strength
of the credit union movment is consistent with our hypothesis that differences
in the interests of constituents influence the choices taken by provincial
regulators.

TABLE V
Rank Correlations Between Credit Union and Banking Activity, 1979.

Credit Union Variable
1) Credit Union Assets per Capita
2) Credit Union Assets to Bank
Liabilities
3) Credit Union Assets to
Personal Saving Deposits
Held at Bank
Measures
Credit Bank
Union

Bank Variable
A) Business Loans per Capita
B) Business Loans to Personal
Income
C) Bank Assets per Capita
D) Bank Assets to Personal
Income

Rank Correlation Coefficient

t Ratio

1.57*
1.85*
1.57*
.92
1.57*
1.85*
1.57*
.92
1.85*
2.04**
1.85*
1.50*

Significance levels: t.05 = 2.015 (designated **)
t. 10 = 1.476 (designated *)
Note: The "t" ratio measures the statistical significance of the correlation
coefficient. A "t" ratio at the .05 significance level denotes a 95 % probability
that a relation between the variables exists.

38
Inclusion of the Maritime provinces, either individually or as a group, markedly
reduced the significance of the relationship in every case. This finding is rather puzzling
because the co-operative movement in English Canada had its beginnings in Nova
Scotia.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
In this paper we have outlined an approach designed to explain the
divergence of interest between provincial and federal regulators of financial institutions in a federal state, as well as between provinces themselves. Evidence
from Canadian experience has to varying degrees upheld our theoretical
predictions. Nevertheless, the analysis remains incomplete. For example, we
have focused in the present analysis on regulatory situations in which provincial regulators have an incentive to supply regulation that differs from both
federal and other provincial regulation. On the other hand, federal and provincial authorities do co-operate in some areas of regulatory concern. We
therefore need to extend our model to develop predictions about the circumstances in which such co-operation can be expected. Too little attention
was paid to the constraints on differences between policies pursued by federal
and provincial regulators. Do wide differences in approach lead to pressures
for conformity in regulation and, if so, what determines which regulator will
be required to conform to the other?
Finally, the structure of regulation is not unchanging; the pattern of provincial and federal regulation responds to innovations in the financial industry. The jurisdictional pattern also responds to the level and variability of
interest rates. For example, the opportunity cost of reserve requirements rises
as interest rates rise. The last decade has seen significant growth in the share of
banking activity under regulatory jurisdictions with low reserve requirements.
In Canada, both near-banks and foreign banks have increased their shares,
and the chartered banks have stepped up their international operations, which
are generally less regulated than domestic operations. The regulators with
declining jurisdictional shares then typically respond by relaxing their regulaon Canadian chartered banks were
tions; for example, reserve requirements
39
lowered in the 1980 BankAct.
Volatile interest rates also encourage financial innovations and changing
jurisdictional patterns. New types of "financial futures" instruments have appeared in recent years that allow financial institutions to hedge against adverse
interest rates movements. The volume of trading in such instruments has increased dramatically, and some of the trading is for speculative rather than for
hedging purposes. Whether, how, and by whom such trading should be
regulated are questions being vigorously debated among regulators and
academics. Further study may produce a framework for predicting the changes
in regulatory patterns that occur in response to such financial market
developments.

39

Supra note 7.

